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LANDLORD-TENANT: THE DUTY TO MITIGATE
DAMAGES
RICHARD C. GROLL*
SSUME THAT a tenant enters into a lease of certain premises for
a one year term, September 1, 1967 to August 31, 1968, at a
stipulated rental of two hundred dollars per month. On Febru-
ary 1, 1968, the tenant decides that he wishes to move out of his
current premises. Naturally, he wishes to avoid his obligations under
his current lease to pay the monthly rental. This is not an uncommon
situation. A tenant, by reason of changed circumstances, the avail-
ability of more suitable or preferable premises or like reasons, can
find himself in this position. Faced with this dilemma, his current
obligations under the existing lease and his desire for new premises-
what legal courses of action are open to the tenant?
SURRENDER
The simplest solution for the tenant is to effectuate a surrender;
that is, the tenant can end his lease obligations by having an agreement
with his landlord to this effect.1 Since an agreement gave rise to the
creation of the landlord-tenant relationship, and this agreement was,
at least in part, a conveyance, an agreement can give rise to the ter-
mination of relationship, and constitute a reconveyance to the land-
lord. Such a surrender, however, cannot be forced upon the landlord
by the unilateral action of the tenant; it can only occur by reason
of an agreement between the parties to put an end to the landlord-
tenant relationship. 2
* MR. GROLL is an Assistant Professor of Law at the DePaul University College of
Law. He received an A.B. from Northwestern University, a J.D. cum laude from the
Loyola University School of Law, and he has a LL.M. from the Northwestern Univer-
sity School of Law.
132 Am. Jim. Landlord & Tenant § 900 (1941): "A surrender of a tenancy . . . is
a yielding up of the tenancy to the owner of the reversion or remainder, wherein the
tenancy is submerged and extinguished by agreement. A surrender may be either by
agreement of the parties or by operation of law."
232 Am. JuR. Landlord & Tenant § 901 (1941): " A surrender . . . occurs only
through the consent or agreement of the parties evidenced either by an express agree-
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On this basis, if the tenant can persuade his landlord to consummate
a surrender, and the technical requirements are properly satisfied,8 the
tenant, from and after the date of surrender, is relieved of future
liability under the lease.4 While this solution may be the simplest in
theory and most advantageous to the tenant, he may have difficulty
in obtaining the consent of his landlord.
ABANDONMENT
Suppose the tenant, unable to obtain the agreement of the landlord
to a surrender, decides to abandon the leased premises and renounce
his obligations under the lease. Can the tenant expect that his landlord
will take positive action to find a replacement tenant, so that he will
not be liable for the full two hundred dollars per month rent?
Obviously, if the lease contains a provision obligating the landlord
to find a replacement tenant and thereby lessen the tenant's liability,
he must pursue such course of action.' In the absence of such provi-
sion, however, the overwhelming majority of courts hold that the
landlord may let the premises lie idle and collect the rent in full from
the abandoning tenant.' The landlord need take no positive action.
In Goldman v. Broyles,7 the tenant abandoned the premises prior
to the end of the lease term and sought release from the landlord
for future rent. The landlord refused. The facts further indicate that
while the demised premises laid unoccupied, a third party approached
the landlord, making inquiry as to renting them. The landlord told
the third party "that he had nothing to do with the renting of the
ment or by an unequivocal act inconsistent with the terms of the lease and with the
relation of landlord and tenant .... "
S A Statute of Frauds may be applicable so as to require the surrender of an interest
greater than one year to be evidenced by a writing; e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 59, § 2
(1965).
4 As to release of the tenant's liability for subsequently accruing rent, see Annots., 18
A.L.R. 971 (1922) & 58 A.L.R. 906 (1929). As to release of the tenant's liability for
covenants which depend upon the continuation of the tenancy, see Annot., 51 A.L.R.
1062 (1927). As to the tenant's liability for past breaches, see Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1064
(1927).
5Harmon v. Callahan, 214 Ill. App. 104, 121 N.E. 194 (1919); see generally Annots.,
40 A.L.R. 198 (1926) & 126 A.L.R. 1224 (1940).
6 See generally Annots., 40 A.L.R. 198 (1926) & 126 A.R. 1224 (1940). As to the
Illinois position, the Supreme Court of Illinois has indicated its acceptance of the
majority view, Selz v. Stafford, 284 Il. 610, 120 N.E. 462 (1918).
7 141 S.W. 283 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
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premises and referred him to the appellant [tenant].' In the action,
the landlord sought recovery from the tenant for the full rent for the
full balance of the lease term. The tenant argued that the court, in
arriving at a verdict, should deduct that amount for which the landlord,
by the use of ordinary care, could have rented the premises to another
party. The court replied: "We hold ... as a matter of law that where
a tenant breaches the contract, the landlord is not obliged to endeavor
to let the premises for the benefit of the tenant who refuses to continue
in occupancy under the lease."9 Therefore, where the tenant abandons
the premises, prior to the expiration of the term, the landlord may let
the premises lie idle and collect the rent in full from the tenant, even
though rerenting is possible. In the cited cases, the landlord was re-
lieved of the responsibility of rerenting even though a third person
voluntarily presented himself to the landlord.
A small minority of courts have concluded that the landlord has a
duty, when faced with an abandonment of the demised premises by
the tenant, to lessen the tenant's rental liability.10 The view apparently
stems from an application of the contract rule of avoidable conse-
quences." Under this rule, the non-breaching plaintiff cannot recover
those damages which he could have prevented by using reasonable
means.
In Lawson v. Callaway,2 the Supreme Court of Kansas declared
that the minority rule prevailed in Kansas, and cited the line of cases
which constituted its authority. The court said, "It is a general rule
that after a wrong has been committed it is the duty of the injured
party to make reasonable efforts to prevent an increase or extension
of the injury, and, if he fails to do so, he cannot recover for such
increased injury." 8 Applying that principle to the landlord-tenant re-
lationship, the court stated, "When a tenant abandons leased premises
and ceases to pay rent, a landlord is not privileged to collect stipulated
rent in full if he can make the premises earn something by reletting
them."'1
4
8 d. at 285.
9 Id. at 286.
0 See generally Annots., 40 A.L.R. 193 (1926) & 126 A.L.R. 1221 (1940).
IlMcCoa icK, DAMAGES § 127 (1935).
12 131 Kan. 789, 293 P. 503 (1930).
13 id. at 790, 293 P. at 504.
14 Id.
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While the minority view, which compels the landlord to take positive
action to lessen the tenant's liability, may have merit, objection has
been raised to its adoption. In an Illinois case, 5 the court set forth
three objections: "(1) The lessor would be required to seek out new
tenants continually; (2) the lessor's action might be held to consti-
tute an unwilling acceptance of the surrender; and (3) the lessor would
be required to accept in a personal relationship a party he does not
wish to accept."' 6
As to the first objection, even the minority cases, which imposed
upon the landlord the duty to seek out a replacement tenant, do not
relieve the tenant, completely, of his lease obligations.' 7 In such cases,
the tenant is liable to the landlord for that amount over and above the
rental that was, or could have been, secured from a replacement tenant.
At least one author has suggested that the action of the landlord in
reletting should be viewed as an agency.' 8 The landlord, charged with
his legal obligation, relets on behalf of the abandoning tenant. This
reletting transaction thereby takes the form of a forced assignment or
sublease. 19 On this basis, the economics of the situation should be
such that the imposition of this duty on the landlord should not
necessarily provoke tenants into abandonment.
As to the second objection, the cases present a very muddy picture.
Under common law principles, if a tenant stops paying rent, but does
not physically abandon the premises, the landlord cannot terminate
the lease, unless such power has been specifically granted by a lease
provision or by statute.2" The landlord's remedy is to sue, at law, for
damages. If, however, the tenant abandons the premises in addition
to his failure to pay rent, the landlord has the right to reclaim posses-
sion and terminate the lease.2 This action of the tenant is viewed as
15 Wohl v. Yelen, 22 Ill. App. 2d 455, 161 N.E.2d 339 (1959).
16.d at 464, 161 N.E.2d at 343.
17 Supra note 10.
18 McCormick, The Rights of the Landlord upon Abandonment of the Premises by the
Tenant, 23 MIcH. L. REv. 211, 213 (1925).
19 2 TiFFANY, LANDLORD & TENANT § 1341 (1910).
20 Id. at § 194; however, many states have statutes allowing the landlord to terminate
the tenancy for non-payment of rent; e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 57 (1965).
2132 Am. JUR. Landlord & Tenant § 518 (1941): "If the tenant wrongfully abandons
the possession of the demised premises, the landlord may re-enter and terminate the lease
and in so re-entering, he is not guilty of trespass. The relinquishment of possession by
the tenant and the resumption of possession by the landlord operate generally as a
surrender by operation of law." See generally Annot., 4 A.L.R. 673 (1919).
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an offer to effect a surrender, which the landlord can accept. The
landlord can accept by the resumption of possession. Once the land-
lord does resume possession, a surrender by operation of law has
occurred, and the tenant is relieved of his obligation as to subsequently
accruing rent. It has been held, however, that where the landlord has
entered upon the demised premises for the purpose of taking steps to
preserve the premises or make repairs, such action does not constitute
a resumption of possession so as to give rise to a surrender. 2 It is
generally held that any action by the landlord, which is inconsistent
with the continuation of the landlord-tenant relationship, constitutes an
acceptance of the tenant's offer and results in a surrender by operation
of law.
Based upon the notion of surrender by operation of law, there is a
divergence in the courts as to the legal consequences of a landlord's
reletting the premises after abandonment.2 Can it not be said that the
landlord's action in reletting is an act inconsistent with the continuation
of the landlord-tenant relationship, since it deprives the tenant of
future access to the premises, and therefore, such action should con-
stitute an acceptance of the proferred surrender? This is a view ac-
cepted by more than one court. 4 Once this view is accepted, obviously,
the notion of reletting in mitigation of damages is lost.
In M.L. Improvement Corp. v. State,25 the landlord in question
leased certain property to the State of New York. Prior to the expira-
tion of the lease term, the tenant abandoned the premises; in addition,
the tenant sent a letter to the landlord which stated, in part, that the
landlord "was at liberty to let the premises on the best terms and con-
ditions obtainable. ' 26 The landlord did not relet. When sued for
rent, the tenant contended that the verdict should be reduced, since
its damages might have been reduced or eliminated had the landlord
relet. The court responded, "The claimant [landlord] was under no
duty to relet the premises for the benefit of the state [tenant] . . . ;
and if it had done so . . . its action would have amounted to an ac-
2 2 See generally Annot., 110 A.L.R. 372 (1937).
23 See generally Annots., 3 A.L.R. 1080 (1919); 52 A.L.R. 154 (1928); 61 A.L.R. 773
(1929); 110 A.L.R. 368 (1937).
24 Id.
25 118 Misc. 605, 194 N.Y.S. 165 (1922), aff'd 204 App. Div. 733, 199 N.Y.S. 263
(1923).
26 118 Misc. 605, 194 N.Y.S. 167 (1922).
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ceptance of the proferred surrender, and the state would have been
released from further liability. '2 7
The aforementioned case is indicative of a line of New York cases,
which appear to pronounce that a surrender will result from the land-
lord's reletting, unless the landlord takes this action pursuant to a
specific agreement with the abandoning tenant. In Hodgkiss v. Dayton-
Brower Co.,2 8 the tenant abandoned the demised premises, and the
landlord informed the tenant of an intention to hold him liable for
rent "and to relet for the latter's account."2 The landlord did relet.
The court found that a surrender had been effectuated, and stated:
The lease in the case at bar does not provide for a reletting for the account of the
defendant [tenant] in the event of an abandonment, and so the tenant cannot be
said to have acquiesced in the proposal of the landlord for its benefit. The landlord's
statement to the tenant of intention to hold it liable for rent and to relet for the
latter's account does not sustain an implied agreement for such reletting.30
A second line of cases has taken the position that the landlord,
when faced with an abandonment of the demised premises, may relet,
and such action will not constitute an acceptance of the proferred
surrender; no surrender will occur if the landlord notifies the tenant
of (1) the landlord's refusal to accept, and (2) his intention to relet
for the tenant's account.3  The Supreme Court of Missouri, in Von
Schleinitz v. North Hotel Co., 2 sustained this view by stating:
[U]pon the abandonment of the premises by a tenant the landlord may refuse to
accept a surrender, and after notice to the lessee of his intention to do so, relet the
premises for the best rent obtainable, and recover the difference between the rent
reserved in the lease and the rent received from the subsequent tenant .. ..
Still another series of cases hold that the question of surrender
turns on the intention of the landlord at the time of reletting3 4 In
McGrath v. Shalett,3 5 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
summarized the various methods employed by courts in dealing with
the problem:
27 Id.
28 93 Misc. 109, 156 N.Y.S. 907 (1915).
29 Id. at 908.
30 Id.
81 Supra note 23.
32 323 Mo. 1110, 23 S.W.2d 64 (1929).
33 Id. at 1133, 23 S.W.2d at 75, as quoted from 16 R.C.L. 970-72 (1929).
84 Supra note 23.
85 114 Conn. 622, 159 A. 633 (1932).
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In some states, a reletting terminates the leases as a matter of law. A second line
of authorities hold that this result follows unless there is notice to the tenant of
the landlord's refusal to accept the surrender and of his intention to relet. The third
school does not set up any arbitrary standard, but holds the question of acceptance
to be one of intention and a question of fact.8 6
The question under this third view thus becomes-did the landlord
relet for his own account or for the account of the tenant?
In McGrath, after abandonment, the landlord notified the tenant
that "strict compliance with the terms of the lease would be insisted
on.'y37 The landlord then allowed a charitable organization to occupy
the premises. Thereafter, the premises were altered and relet. At least
part of the premises were relet for a longer period than the original
lease term. The landlord never notified the tenant that the premises
were being relet on his account. The court sustained a lower court
finding that there was no acceptance of the surrender in fact. Viewed
as a whole, the result has merit. The tenant notified the landlord and
subsequently vacated while the rent was still unpaid. The landlord
communicated his intention to hold the tenant to the lease; thereafter
the landlord relet. Should the fact of reletting, even if coupled with a
failure to notify the tenant specifically that such action is not an ac-
ceptance of surrender, necessarily be construed as an acceptance? The
court answered in the negative. In addition, the court said: "[The
landlord] should not be penalized for attempting to minimize the
damages...."
In contrast to the approaches thus far set forth, one court 9 analyzed
the problem as follows:
A tenant may not, by abandoning the premises and ceasing to pay rent, relieve him-
self of obligation to pay rent. He cannot reap an advantage from his own breach of
the contract. If he desires to surrender, he must secure the landlord's consent, and,
if he alleges surrender, he must establish unequivocal manifestation of consent on
the part of the landlord to termination of the relation of landlord and tenant.40
The court continued by stating, "The tenant does not need to be told
what his obligation is. He knows it is to pay rent to the end of the
term, according to the covenant in the lease. Therefore, reletting does
not establish release of obligation to pay rent, and notice of reletting
86M. at 625, 159 A. at 634.
87d. at 623, 159 A. at 633.
38 Id. at 626, 159 A. at 634.
89 Guy v. Gould, 126 Kan. 25, 266 P. 925 (1928).
401d. at 25, 266 P. at 925.
1968]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
is not necessary to prevent surrender.""1 It should be pointed out,
however, that the court rendering this language was the Supreme
Court of Kansas, and this court has placed a positive duty upon the
landlord to relet in mitigation of the tenant's damages.4 2 Once placing
the responsibility upon the landlord to seek out a replacement tenant,
the court could not reasonably take the position that such reletting
could easily be construed as an acceptance of the tenant's proferred
surrender.
In attempting to draw a conclusion from the multitude of cases
which have been rendered on this point, one can assert that the con-
tract rule of avoidable consequences should have a place in the solu-
tion to the problem. If in a case involving a breach of contract, the
plaintiff must make reasonable efforts to curtail his loss, it can be
argued that a landlord should be forced to the same efforts. Therefore,
it would seem that when a tenant has breached his agreement and re-
pudiated the lease, that the landlord should be permitted, if not en-
couraged or required, to make similar efforts to relet the premises.3
If the landlord does pursue such a course of action-should the
tenant be heard to complain? Such action is in the interests of the
tenant, as his damages are reduced or eliminated. It is frequently
argued that if the landlord does relet, such action is inconsistent with
the continuance of the landlord-tenant relationship. Yet a tenant who
has abandoned the premises cannot genuinely be disturbed. His pos-
session has been only constructively infringed upon. Where a tenant
voluntarily assigns his leasehold interests to another, his possession
comes to an end, and yet, his contract duties (one of which is his duty
to pay rent) remain.44 Could not the abandonment and renunciation
be viewed, not only as a proferred surrender, but also as an offer
for the landlord to assign on the tenant's behalf? If the tenant has
abandoned and the landlord relets, the landlord should suffer no
penalty other than crediting the tenant with the rent so received.
The writer suggests that one motivating factor in those decisions
which have construed the landlord's reletting action as a surrender
has been a sense of protection for the tenant. The courts may be
411d.
42 Supra note 12 and corresponding text.
43Helzinger v. Novak, 172 Minn. 369, 215 N.W. 515 (1927).
4 4 Mayer v. Dwiggins, 114 Neb. 184, 206 N.W. 744; see generally 32 AM. Jua. Landlord
& Tenant § 356 (1925).
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prompted to act on behalf of the tenant, as the party with the lesser
economic bargaining power. Such decisions, however, may have the
overall effect of discouraging landlords from taking steps to relet, lest
their conduct be construed as a surrender and release the tenant from
future rent liability. This approach works to the detriment of tenants
as a group, even though it may be applauded by the particular tenant
at bar. Would not tenants be in a better position if the landlord did
mitigate the damages? Would landlords be in a worse position?
The third objection rendered to the imposition of the mitigation
of damages rule in the area of landlord-tenant is that the lessor would
be required to accept in a personal relationship a party he does not
wish to accept. While this argument has, on its face, some merit, it
must be considered in the full light of the problem. It has been sug-
gested that the personal element is even more important in an employ-
ment contract, and yet the courts have held that a wrongfully dis-
charged employee must mitigate his damages by accepting similar
available employment.45
In this regard, the obligation to mitigate damages should not be
interpreted to compel the landlord to relet to any replacement tenant.
The landlord should have the right to refuse to allow possession of
his property to fall into certain hands. There should be some bounds
to his obligation. Case law has established limits to the landlord's
obligations in those situations where the lease specifically provides that
on abandonment of the demised premises by the tenant before the ex-
piration of the term, the landlord has a duty to use diligence to pro-
cure another tenant." Pursuant to this contract duty, the cases hold,
generally, that the landlord need not relet to a tenant who would use
the premises for a purpose different than that contemplated in the
original lease;47 nor is the landlord obligated to alter or increase his
obligations (e.g., extending the length of the lease term) in order to
secure a replacement tenant." The limits, so defined, should be as
applicable where the law imposes the duty to relet as when the lease
imposes the duty.
4 5 Supra note 15.
4 6 See generally Annot., 115 A.L.R. 206 (1938).
47In Allen v. Saunders, 6 Neb. 436 (1877), the court held that the landlord was
obligated to relet the premises, if he could reasonably do so, but he was not bound
to relet to a tenant who would use the premises for a different purpose, if the landlord
in good faith thought the changed use would damage the premises.
48 Woodbury v. Sparell Print, 198 Mass. 1, 84 N.E. 441 (1908).
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Finally, it is asserted that the relationship of landlord-tenant is more
than a personal relationship, it is a business relationship. This discus-
sion involves the business of the landlord. In defining the obligation
of the landlord, emotional arguments relating to the personal nature
of the relationship should be set aside as less than determinative. In
all events, it is not suggested that the landlord must accept a replace-
ment tenant, or any particular replacement tenant. If, however, a
substitute tenant can be found, who will use the premises for the
purposes initially contemplated and will let under terms which do not
enhance the landlord's obligation, then the landlord should be obligated
to relet or credit the abandoning tenant with the rent which would
have been received.
ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLEASE
It appears that a tenant's expectations regarding action to be taken
by the landlord after his abandonment are diminished. The question
next presenting itself is-what unilateral action can be taken by the
tenant? Can he find his own replacement tenant?
A basic incident of the tenant's leasehold interest is the right to
transfer, and this right can be exercised without securing the consent
or approval of the landlord. 9 Therefore, a tenant can seek out his own
replacement tenant and assign his interest to that new tenant., ° Such
action will not operate as a surrender, and will not terminate the
tenant's obligations under the lease. The tenant remains liable on the
lease as a contract, and should the assignee fail to fully perform, the
landlord has a remedy against the tenant.51 However, the tenant, by
assigning, can cause another (namely, the assignee) to be legally bound
to perform.52 On this basis, a solution could be for him to find his own
replacement tenant and assign his leasehold interest.
There is one important caveat to this straightforward solution, and
that is the legal import of a restriction on the right of assignment con-
tained in the lease. It is not uncommon, in fact it is most common, for
4932 Am. JuR. Landlord & Tenant § 319 (1941).
50 No distinction will be made in the text between assignment and sublease. For a
discussion of this distinction, see 1 A MERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.57 (A.J. Casner ed.
1952).
51See generally 36 A.L.R. 311 (1925).
52 To what extent an assignee becomes bound to perform, see 1 AmnncAn LAW OF
PROPERTY §§ 3.61, 9.4 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). To what extent a sublessee becomes
bound to perform, see id. at § 3.62.
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leases to contain a covenant which provides, in substance, that the
tenant may not assign his interest without the prior written consent of
the landlord. If the tenant's lease contains such a restrictive provision,
he must once again approach his landlord before he is free to avoid
any of his lease obligations, and of course, the landlord need not be
cooperative. In this regard, it has been suggested that a landlord,
who finds himself in this most advantageous position, has the right to
arbitrarily refuse to give his consent.5" It has been held that irrespec-
tive of the identity of the proposed assignee, the landlord may refuse
to grant his consent, and that the result is not changed by a showing
that only whim motivated the landlord.
Though clauses restricting the right of the tenant to assign are
upheld as to basic validity, they are not favored. The English courts
announced their disfavor at an early date in Dumpor's Case.54 In that
case, the court announced that the landlord, by granting consent to
an assignee on one occasion, thereby waived the restriction, so that
the tenant or the assignee were free to reassign without the consent
of the landlord.
Along the same line, there is authority to the effect that even though
the restriction specifically requires the written consent of the landlord,
his conduct and/or his oral acquiescence can be effectual.55 In Cohen
v. Todd,56 the lease contained a covenant which forbade any assign-
ment without the written consent of the lessor. The tenant assigned
without consent. The assignee paid the rent to the landlord, which
was accepted. The court held that the landlord waived his rights under
the restrictive covenant, and said: "A covenant against assignment
without the written consent of the lessor is one inserted for the lessor's
benefit, and he may waive the requirement of written consent by his
conduct."57 As to the conduct sufficient to constitute a waiver, the
court stated: "When, with knowledge of the . . . assignment, he [the
landlord] receives rent from the . . . assignee, such conduct, unex-
plained, is conclusive evidence of a waiver, for it is a recognition of
the assignee as a tenant."5 "
53 See generally 32 Am. JuR. Landlord & Tenant § 343 (1941).
544 Coke 119b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1110 (1603).
55 Katz v. Miller, 148 Wis. 63, 133 N.W. 1091 (1912).
56 130 Minn. 227, 153 N.W. 531 (1915).
57 Id. at 229, 153 N.W. at 531.
5s Id.
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In Mattox v. Wescott,59 the court went to the point of holding that
a provision in a lease prohibiting assignment without the lessor's
written consent can be waived by an oral acquiescence in the assign-
ment. The court concluded that since the restriction was for the land-
lord's benefit, it could be waived by him, and further, that if the
tenant has entered into a binding assignment based upon the landlord's
oral consent, it has been so waived.
In an attempt to establish a policy in favor of the application of
the mitigation of damages rule to the landlord-tenant relationship,
at a time when the authorities appear to run to the contrary, 0 an
Illinois court, in Wohl v. Yelen, 6' seized upon the notion of waiver to
diminish the scope of a lease covenant prohibiting assignment or sub-
lease without the landlord's written consent. The facts indicate that
the tenant, faced with a lease provision requiring the landlord's
written consent to assign or sublease, approached the landlord request-
ing such consent. The landlord, orally, indicated that he would consent
to a sublease, provided the tenant could find one at the same rental.
The landlord furnished the tenant with a "For Rent" sign, which was
posted on the demised premises. Upon the tenant's finding, and pre-
senting to the landlord, a prospective subtenant, the landlord refused
permission to sublet.
The court, after reviewing these facts, held that the conduct of the
landlord amounted to a waiver of his right to enforce the restrictive
provision. His conduct was such that the landlord was estopped to
deny the validity of the oral agreement and was bound to a waiver of
the covenant against assignment. The court was clearly motivated to
this result by its apparent approval of the application of the duty to
mitigate damages to the landlord-tenant relationship. The court indi-
cated that in circumstances such as were presented in this case, "He
[the landlord] is bound to accept the sublessee tendered, unless he
had some valid objection to the new tenant." 2 This statement is not
59 156 Ala. 492, 47 So. 170 (1908).
6o As to the general view, see Annots., 40 A.L.R. 198 (1926) & 126 A.L.R. 1224 (1940).
As to the Illinois position, the Supreme Court of Illinois has indicated its acceptance of
the majority view, Selz v. Stafford, 284 11. 610, 120 N.E. 462 (1918). For a discussion
of the Illinois cases, see Comment, Landlord's Obligation to Mitigate when Tenant
Abandons, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 332.
61 Supra note 15.
62 Supra note 15 at 461, 161 N.E.2d at 342.
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consistent with the notion of waiver as such, since if the landlord
had waived his right to enforce the restrictive provision, then it is
waived; the landlord could not thereafter block the sublease, even if
the proposed subtenant was objectionable. The court's statement is,
however, consistent with the notion that, even with a restrictive provi-
sion, the landlord ought not to be able to prohibit assignment or sub-
lease unless there is a legitimate reason to so prohibit.
Following the lead of the Wohl case, the same Illinois court dealt
with a similar situation in Scheinfeld v. Muntz T.V.,63 in which prem-
ises were leased to Muntz T.V. for a ten year term. The lease contained
a covenant which forbade assignment or sublease without the land-
lord's written consent. About four years after the inception of the
lease term, Muntz, with the written consent of the landlord, sublet
the premises to one Breuer.64 Sometime thereafter, Breuer sought to
sublet the premises, for the same use, to one Calument; it requested
the consent of Muntz and the landlord; the landlord refused consent.
Breuer then vacated the premises and announced that it considered
its obligations under the lease to be ended. In considering the extent
of liability of the abandoning tenant, the court stated:
[T]he contractual rule compelling mitigation of damages applies to leases. In doing
so we emphasize that the validity of the provisions of the lease and sublease in the
present case prohibiting assignment and subletting without the landlord's consent
and giving the landlord the option to rerent on such terms as he sees fit, is not in
question. We do not mean that the landlord must accept any subtenant submitted by
the lessee, that he must release the lessee from further responsibility for rent or
that he must rent his property for a purpose which might damage it. The landlord's
duty to mitigate damages does not prevent him from exercising his choice of tenants
in rerenting the premises. But when the duty to mitigate is raised by the tender of
suitable sublessee, the option of the landlord lies between consenting to the sublease
or crediting the tenant with the amount which would have been paid by the sub-
leasee had he been accepted. The landlord may not arbitrarily reject a suitable
subleasee and yet continue to hold the tenant liable for the whole rental in default.60
With this decision, the Illinois court dealt the most decisive blow to
the effective scope of this type of covenant. The court, in effect, took
a position in favor of the imposition of a duty upon the landlord to
lessen the liability of the abandoning tenant. The thrust of the holding
63 67 Ill. App. 2d 8, 214 N.E.2d 506 (1966).
64 The written consent given by the landlord specifically prohibited further assignment
without the landlord's consent, so as to avoid the rule in Dumpor's Case, supra note 54
and corresponding text.
65 67 fI. App. 2d 8, 16, 214 N.E.2d 506, 511 (1966).
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is limited, however, by the court's suggestion that the duty to mitigate
arises only upon the tenant's profer of an acceptable subtenant. Where
the tenant profers a subtenant, the landlord need not accept; that is,
he need not consent to an assignment or sublease to any particular
subtenant. However, if the landlord arbitrarily refuses consent, then
he must credit the abandoning tenant with the rent that would have
been received had he consented.
Following the same trend in Illinois cases, Reget v. Dempsey-Tegler
& Co.66 presented the issue of what constitutes reasonable refusal of
consent to a proposed sublease, such that the landlord will not be
bound to credit the abandoning tenant with the rental which would
have been received from the subtenant. The facts indicate that the
premises were leased to the tenant, an investment broker. The lease
specifically provided that the premises were to be used for no other
purpose, and assignments and subleases were forbidden without the
written consent of the landlord. The tenant abandoned the premises,
and thereafter proposed a sublease, which was refused by the land-
lord. The landlord did not dispute his obligation to accept a subtenant,
but argued that this particular subtenant was unsuitable. The landlord
argued that his investigation revealed that the credit of the proposed
subtenant was bad, and that the subtenant intended to use the
premises for a purpose other than that originally contemplated (i.e.,
a beauty shop).
The court replied with three important statements. First, the court
said: "We believe the sublessee's credit is a meaningful factor in the
lessor's determination of the proferred subtenant's acceptability."67
Second, the court said, "[A] landlord should not be required to relet
the premises for a different purpose if he reasonably believes that such
use will damage the premises.1 68 Finally, the court indicated that the
burden was upon the tenant to establish the acceptability of the
proferred subtenant, and without such a showing, the landlord was
not obligated to either accept the subtenant or credit the abandoning
tenant with the rent that would have been received.6
66 70 Ill. App. 2d 32, 216 N.E.2d 500 (1966).
6 71d. at 37, 216 N.E.2d at 503.
68 Id. at 38, 216 N.E.2d at 503.
69 As to the instances when the landlord will be legally justified in refusing his
consent, and such refusal will not bind him to credit the tenant with the rent which
would have been received, see Annot., 115 A.L.R. 206 (1938); supra notes 47, 48 and
corresponding text.
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While the Illinois courts have not, as such, repudiated the rule that
a landlord, armed with a covenant in the lease which prohibits assign-
ment or sublease without his written consent, has an unrestricted right
to refuse to grant consent to a proposed assignment or sublease, the
rule has been severely limited. If the tenant profers an acceptable sub-
tenant, who has adequate credit and who will use the premises in a
manner not inconsistent with the original tenancy, then the landlord
is under a duty to mitigate. The landlord has the duty to at least
credit that tenant, should he abandon the premises, with the rent which
would have been received from the subtenant.
CONCLUSION
While there has been considerable concern expressed about the
landlord-tenant relationship, 70 the law has changed only slightly over
the years. It appears that we have only begun to see movements under-
taken on behalf of the rights of tenants. If this concern is legitimate,
then a re-evaluation must be had of those legal principles now govern-
ing the relationship.
One principle which can be subjected to criticism involves the land-
lord's legal obligation when he is faced with an abandonment of the
premises by the tenant. With only slight variation, the courts have
held that a landlord may let the premises lie idle and collect the rent
in full from the abandoning tenant. The landlord need take no action
to find a replacement tenant, and thereby make the premises produc-
tive. In fact, some courts have gone to the extreme of invoking the
arbitrary rule that if the landlord does relet to a replacement tenant,
such action will constitute a "surrender," and the tenant will be
relieved of liability for subsequently accruing rent.
While it can be argued that the landlord should not be placed under
a positive duty to relet, it is urged that if the landlord does wish to
pursue such a course of action, then the law should encourage, and
not penalize him. Where it can be shown from an examination of all
the facts and circumstances that the landlord's action was to relet in
mitigation of damages, then such action should not constitute a surren-
der. Once the law favors such action, then and only then will landlords
70 See PROJECT ON SOCIAL WELFARE, HOUSING FOR THE POOR: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
(1967) (published by New York University School of Law under a research grant of
the Office of Economic Opportunity).
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begin to think and act along those lines. This is a small step to be
taken where the courts do not wish to swallow the whole apple and
compel landlords to relet.
As to that situation where the tenant profers an acceptable sub-
tenant, it is asserted that the Illinois courts have, and are, pursuing a
wise course. The landlord should not be able to arbitrarily block,
through a covenant against assignment, a proposed assignment or sub-
lease, without suffering the economic consequences thereof.
